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Physicalism and consciousness
The so-called phenomenal concept strategy3 (Loar, 1990) is a physicalist set of responses to 
anti-physicalist arguments that aims at accommodating the subjective chara er of consciousness 
to a physicalist metaphysical framework. More  ecifically, the strategy aims at responding to 
 ecific arguments, namely, the conceivability argument and the knowledge argument. In rough 
words, those well-known arguments share the same structure in that they depart from epistemic 
premises about the lack of deducibility of phenomenal truths from physical truths and move to 
the conclusion that phenomenal truths cannot be reduced to physical truths; hence physicalism 
must be false.
(PHYS) □ (P→ ⌐Q)
Let P be the complete physical description of the world, and Q the phenomenal description 
of the world. The conditional is meant to express that once every minimal physical a ect of the 
world is settled, the phenomenal a ects of the world are necessarily settled.
The knowledge argument formulated by Frank Jackson (1982) begins by asking us to con-
sider the lack of an a priori connection between phenomenal and physical truths. This is the ex-
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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to critically assess and respond to two objections advanced by Dan-
iel Stoljar (2005) against the so-called phenomenal concept strategy. My goal is to defend 
the physicalist response to both the knowledge argument and the conceivability argument 
against Stoljar’s objections. Regarding the conceivability argument, I want to show that the 
distinction mobilized by Stoljar between a priori and a priori synthesizable does not help us 
to elucidate the psychophysical condition for that is a clear disanalogy between the cases 
presented by Stoljar. Regarding the knowledge argument, I want to show that Stoljar’s ar-
gument about experienced Mary undermines the fundamental premise of the knowledge 
argument and therefore it cannot be mobilized to deflate the phenomenal concept strategy 
against the knowledge argument. My conclusion will be that Stoljar’s points are ineffective 
against the phenomenal concept strategy.
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planation for the reason that Mary, the brilliant scientist who 
knows every physical fact about visual physiology, cannot 
deduce phenomenal truths from physical truths. She cannot 
make the appropriate deductions because there is an ontolog-
ical gap between the phenomenal and the physical realm. The 
lack of an a priori connection should entail an ontological dif-
ference between the physical and the phenomenal.
(P1) Q is not a priori deducible from P.
(P2) If Q is not a priori deducible from P, then P does 
not metaphysically necessitate Q.
(P3) If P does not metaphysically necessitate Q, then 
physicalism is false.
(C) Therefore, physicalism is false.
In the conceivability argument David Chalmers (2010) 
asks us to conceive of a philosophical zombie, a creature phys-
ically and functionally identical to us but with no such thing 
as subjective experience. To conceive of zombies (P→ ⌐Q) is 
to consider that (PHYS) is contingent, which alone violates 
(PHYS). Following Chalmers (2010), we can now see how 
the zombie argument is formulated:
(P1) P→ ⌐Q is conceivable.
(P2) If P→ ⌐Q is conceivable, P→ ⌐Q is metaphysically 
possible.
(P3) If P→ ⌐Q is metaphysically possible, physicalism 
is false.
(C) Therefore, physicalism is false.
Let P stand for all physical truths in the world and Q 
stand for all phenomenal truths. In (P1) the physical prop-
erties are kept constant, whereas the phenomenal properties 
vary. As explained previously, to conceive of a physical du-
plicate lacking phenomenal states is to conceive of minimal 
physicalism as false. Further, as conceivability implies meta-
physical possibility, the metaphysical possibility of zombies is 
inconsistent with physicalism. The conceivability argument 
is clearly valid. Physicalists need to show that at least one of 
the premises is false. Objections to the argument will typically 
question the first two premises: (i) Are zombies conceivable? 
If they are conceivable, (ii) does it follow, as claimed in (P2), 
that they are possible? The proponent of the conceivability 
argument must answer both questions in the affirmative. 
Consequently, physicalists will say no to either the first or the 
second question. We shall now examine the possible physical-
ist rea ions.
The phenomenal concept strategy consists in offering an 
alternative explanation for the lack of an a priori connection 
between phenomenal and physical truths that the knowledge 
argument and the conceivability argument hold to be true. 
They claim that the disconnection is not due to a property 
difference, but due to a conceptual difference. Mary cannot 
make the appropriate deductions because she lacks a phe-
nomenal concept that can only be acquired by experience. 
This is because phenomenal concepts have  ecial possession 
conditions. This sui generis chara er of phenomenal concepts 
is also held to ensure the aposteriority of the connection be-
tween phenomenal and physical truths. If they are a poste-
riori connected, then the link between conceivability and 
possibility is broken: (P and not Q) is conceivable but needs 
therefore not be metaphysically possible.
So the project consists of two tasks: one is to ascribe 
 ecial features to phenomenal concepts, which makes them 
relevantly different from physical concepts, yielding a sort of 
conceptual dualism. The second task is to provide an alterna-
tive explanation of Mary’s ignorance. The result that type-b 
materialists wish to achieve is the defense of a posteriori 
physicalism. A posteriori physicalism holds that the relation 
of determination between the physical and the phenomenal is 
necessary but a posteriori. This can only to be done with the aid 
of phenomenal concepts. The idea is that phenomenal con-
cepts have to be chara erized in a way that they avoid the an-
ti-physicalist conclusion of the conceivability argument and 
Kripke’s arguments against psycho-physical identification. 
Additionally they should provide an alternative explanation 
for Mary’s ignorance. Type-B materialists think that by as-
cribing a  ecial feature to phenomenal concepts, a feature that 
makes them essentially different from physical concepts, we 
achieve the desiderata for responding to the anti-physicalist 
arguments in question.
Experience as the mark 
of the phenomenal
The phenomenal concept strategy aims at providing an 
alternative physicalist explanation of the epistemic gap posed 
by anti-physicalist arguments, that is, of the conceptual inde-
pendence of physical and phenomenal concepts. This alterna-
tive explanation is designed so as to not expand the ontology 
beyond physical facts. The sui generis status of phenomenal 
concepts is, according to some versions of the strategy, due to 
their experience dependence and not due to their referring to 
a  ecial realm of non-physical properties. Phenomenal con-
cept theorists ascribe to concepts of our experience unique 
a ects that distinguish phenomenal concepts from other 
concepts, but they still refer to physical properties. One candi-
date criterion to separate phenomenal concepts from physical 
concepts is offered by the so-called experience thesis, the thesis 
that the possession of these concepts is experience-dependent:
Experience Thesis: One can only possess a 
phenomenal concept C if one undergoes 
the relevant corresponding experience.
The experience thesis is about concept possession. 
However, many versions of the strategy do not endorse the 
experience thesis in the sense of being a requirement for con-
cept possession. Some phenomenal concept theorists think 
that experience is a requirement for  ecial reference-fixing 
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mechanisms, for concept acquisition or even for involving 
different psychological faculties. Regardless of the  ecific 
role versions of this strategy assign to experience, all versions 
agree that phenomenal concepts are experience-dependent 
and that they are, by definition, per ectival. Unpacking the 
experience thesis as a guide to the conceptual independence 
of phenomenal concepts will help us to make the case for the 
phenomenal concept strategy.
Many proponents of the strategy seek to e ablish the 
existence of a binding relationship between a certain type of 
experience and the possession of phenomenal concepts. They 
claim that the only way one might possess phenomenal con-
cepts is by undergoing an appropriate experience. In Lewis’ 
(2004) words: in some cases experience is the best teacher. 
Indeed, the phenomenal concept theorist wants to say that, 
in this case, experience is the only teacher. Some items of 
knowledge cannot be gra ed unless the knower has experi-
enced first-hand the content of concepts involved in those 
items of knowledge. Objective physical descriptions of these 
experiences are not adequate ersatz for the experience in the 
first-person per ective. There is something very intuitive 
about this. In a sense, it is a trivial claim that phenomenal 
concepts are tied to experience. Phenomenal concepts are 
concepts about experiences formed from one’s own per ec-
tive: in order for someone to attend to their own experience 
one needs to possess the appropriate concept, in the same 
way as one needs to possess appropriate concepts in order 
to understand thoughts, ideas etc. It is natural to strength-
en the thesis that phenomenal concepts are constitutively 
tied to experiences, that is, experience is a necessary condi-
tion for one to come in possession of phenomenal concepts. 
If phenomenal concepts are  ecial because they have  ecial 
possession conditions, then the strategy might mobilize this 
chara eristic of phenomenal concepts to neutralize the epis-
temic arguments. Stoljar (2005) adduces two independent ar-
guments against the phenomenal concept strategy’s response 
to the conceivability argument on the one hand and to the 
knowledge argument on the other. First, against the response 
to the conceivability argument, Stoljar argues that no  ecial 
feature of phenomenal concepts can ensure the a posteriority 
of physicalism. Second, against the response to the knowledge 
argument, he argues that the thesis that Mary cannot make 
the appropriate deductions because she lacks the relevant 
concepts is false. In the next two sections I will consider these 
objections in turn. Let us consider the psychophysical condi-
tional (PHYS) again:
(PHYS) □ (P→ ⌐Q)
Stoljar chara erizes the central project of the phenom-
enal concept strategy as that of explaining how the a poste-
riority of the conditional is possible without running into 
Kripkean difficulties. So, in order for the phenomenal con-
cept strategy to succeed, the experience thesis or any replace-
ment thesis to the same effect must entail the a posteriority 
of (PHYS). Nevertheless, he will argue that the experience 
thesis does not entail the a posteriority of the psychophysical 
conditional, hence the strategy will fail.
As discussed previously, there are facts about the nature 
of phenomenal concepts which make them different from 
physical concepts. Each  ecific account of phenomenal con-
cepts assigns different properties to phenomenal concepts. 
Although not all versions of the phenomenal concept strategy 
endorse the experience thesis as formulated in the previous 
chapter, Stoljar’s objection is not restricted to the experience 
thesis, rather it is aimed at all versions of the phenomenal 
concept strategy.
The a priori and the 
a priori synthesizable
Stoljar’s first objection to be considered applies  ecifi-
cally to the treatment of the conceivability argument by the 
phenomenal concept strategy. He begins by distinguishing be-
tween two ways of understanding the conditional: the a priori 
and the a priori synthesizable (Stoljar, 2005).
The a priori:
A→B is a priori if a sufficiently logically acute per-
son who possessed  only the concepts required to 
understand it is in a position to know that it is true 
(478).
The a priori synthesizable: 
A→B is a priori synthesizable if a sufficiently logi-
cally acute person who possessed only the concepts 
required to understand its antecedent is in a position 
to know that it is true (478).
To illustrate this distinction, consider (1):
(1) If y is rectangular, then x has some property or other 
(478),
where (1) is clearly a priori, but not a priori synthesizable, 
since a logically acute person who knows only the concepts 
involved in the antecedent of the conditional—the concept 
Rectangular—is not in a position to a priori synthesize the 
consequent. A logically acute person who lacks the concept 
Property cannot understand the consequent of the condition; 
hence, she is not in a position to understand the conditional. 
Being a priori synthesizable entails being a priori, but not the 
other way around; a priori conditionals may fail to be a priori 
synthesizable as in (1).
To avoid the conceivability argument, the phenomenal 
concept strategist must hold that the conditional (PHYS) is 
not a priori. The crucial premise of the phenomenal concept 
strategy is that the experience thesis entails that (PHYS) is 
not a priori. This is because, for physicalism to be true, P 
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must entail Q. Since we concede the epistemic gap of the 
anti-physicalist arguments, the entailment is not a priori, 
and the only option left is to show that the conditional is a 
posteriori. The experience thesis is crucial because it marks 
the cognitive difference between phenomenal concepts and 
physical concepts. So, the project of the phenomenal concept 
strategy is to argue that because phenomenal concepts are 
experience-dependent, they are conceptually independent 
from physical concepts; hence the conditional is a posteriori. 
Being a posteriori, however, is equivalent to being not a prio-
ri, but not equivalent to being not a priori synthesizable. The 
phenomenal concept strategy claims that the experience 
thesis entails that (PHYS) is not a priori. Stoljar, however, 
wants to show that the experience thesis actually entails that 
(PHYS) is not a priori synthesizable. Not being a priori syn-
thesizable is irrelevant for the a posteriority of (PHYS). It is 
irrelevant because one can find many examples of a priori 
propositions like (1) which are not a priori synthesizable but 
still a priori. One can say that all that the experience thesis 
entails is that (PHYS) is not a priori synthesizable. Grant-
ing that (PHYS) is not a priori synthesizable does not elim-
inate the possibility that (PHYS) is not a priori, like in (1). 
“So there seems to be a logical gap in the suggestion that the 
experience thesis tells us that the conditional is a posteriori. 
What we wanted was a reason to suppose that it was  not a 
priori. What we have is a reason to suppose that it is not a 
priori synthesizable” (479). When failing to point out that 
(PHYS) is not a priori, the experience thesis does not provide 
an answer to the conceivability argument.
Proponents of the strategy could object to this line of 
reasoning by saying that examples like (1) are relevantly 
different from (PHYS), because (1) does not involve phe-
nomenal concepts, while (PHYS) connects the antecedent 
which contains only ordinary concepts and the consequent 
which contains phenomenal concepts. Thus, the distinction 
between a priori and a priori synthesizable could be ignored. 
But Stoljar has a follow-up argument to the same conclusion. 
Stoljar asks us to consider (2), a statement which is relevantly 
like the conditional in that it connects an antecedent contain-
ing an ordinary concept with a consequent containing a phe-
nomenal concept (possession of the concept that appears in 
the consequent of the conditional requires experience):
(2) If x is a number, then x is not a red sensation (479).
Sentence (2) is, like (1), clearly a priori, but not a priori 
synthesizable. Someone who lacks the concept red sensation 
required to understand the consequent of the condition-
al cannot deduce the consequent from the antecedent. The 
problem for the physicalist is if (PHYS) turns out to be a case 
like (2): clearly a priori, but not a priori synthesizable. Then, 
the physicalist would have failed to show the a posteriority of 
(PHYS) through the experience thesis. The lack of a priori 
synthesizability would explain the conceptual independence 
between phenomenal concepts and physical concepts. But, in 
this case, mere conceptual independence does not lead to lack 
of a priori connections.
The phenomenal concept theorist could consider that 
the distinction works in her favor, at least in the case of the 
knowledge argument: Mary’s inability to deduce Q from P 
is not explained by claiming that Q and P refer to different 
properties, but it is explained by the fact that Mary simply 
cannot synthesize those truths a priori. She cannot a priori 
synthesize Q from P because she lacks some crucial concepts 
to understand the consequent of the conditional (a phenom-
enal concept). However, Stoljar advances an independent 
objection against the strategy’s treatment of the knowledge 
argument (which will be addressed at the end of this section). 
For now, the distinction above is aimed at the strategy’s re-
sponse to the conceivability argument.
The proponent of the phenomenal concept strategy 
could argue that Stoljar’s objection works only against ver-
sions of the strategy that are committed to the experience 
thesis. Do other versions also fail in view of Stoljar’s distinc-
tion between the a priori and the a priori synthesizable? Stol-
jar analyzes the version proposed by Hill and McLaughlin 
(1999) to show that not only the experience thesis, but any 
replacement thesis fails in view of the distinction.
According to Hill and McLaughlin (1999), phenome-
nal concepts and physical concepts are governed by different 
epistemic constraints and presuppose use of different facul-
ties. One difference between phenomenal concepts and phys-
ical concepts is that the former are self-presented:
Self-presentation thesis: It is a conceptual 
truth that if I have a red sensation, and if I 
have the concepts and focus my attention 
on the matter, I will thereby come to know 
that I am having (Stoljar, 2005, p. 483).
On the other hand, “it is not a conceptual truth that if 
I am in some overall physical conditional P, and if I have the 
concepts and focus my attention on the matter, I will thereby 
come to know that I am in P” (Stoljar, 2005, p. 483) This is to 
say that, if there is a conditional whose antecedent contains 
an ordinary concept and the consequent contains a self-pre-
senting concept, then the conditional cannot be a priori. Stol-
jar grants that phenomenal concepts might be self-presenting 
in the above sense. Still, he holds that the self-presentation 
thesis, like the experience thesis, cannot explain the posteri-
ority of the psychophysical conditional. A central reason to 
think that (2) poses a problem for the phenomenal concept 
theorist is to assume that applying the negation of a phenom-
enal concept not a red sensation requires possession of the phe-
nomenal concept red sensation; hence the possession of nega-
tions of phenomenal concepts are experience-dependent, or, 
according to Hill and McLaughlin’s version, the negation of 
concepts of experience requires the possession of self-present-
ing concepts. So not a red sensation is self-presenting just as 
red sensation is. On the other hand, possession of the concept 
number is clearly not self-presenting (nor experience-depen-
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dent). The sentence (2) contains theoretical concepts in the 
antecedent and self-presenting concepts in the consequent 
just like in (PHYS). If the reason that (PHYS) is a posteriori 
and appears to be contingent in Hill and McLaughlin’s version 
of the strategy is that these two different kinds of concepts are 
entailed, then (2) should also be a posteriori and have an ap-
pearance of contingency. Nevertheless, (2) is clearly a priori, 
so neither the self-presenting thesis nor the experience thesis 
can be correct.
The physicalist can respond to Stoljar’s observations by 
claiming that cases like (2) (If x is a number, then x is not a 
red sensation [479]) are clearly a priori because the negation 
of a phenomenal concept such as not a red sensation does not 
require possession of the phenomenal concept red sensation. 
Mary, who lacks all kinds of color-related phenomenal con-
cepts, including red sensation, is in a position to know a priori 
that (2) is true if she possesses at least partial understanding of 
the consequent, that is, if she possesses the concept sensation. 
She knows that, if something is a number, then it is definitely 
not a sensation of any kind. She may also possess those con-
cepts second-handedly (through testimony). She may know 
that sensations are usually associated with perceptual states, 
while numbers are not, and that should be enough for Mary 
to know (2) a priori. Stoljar’s reasoning does not pay due at-
tention to the disanalogy between (PHYS) and (2). There are 
many ways to possess the negation of a phenomenal concept 
which does not involve itself the acquisition of a phenomenal 
concept. It is perfectly plausible to possess a nonphenomenal 
concept about a phenomenal concept (without possessing the 
phenomenal concept in question). I can refer to other people’s 
sensation without sharing their sensations. The concepts that 
are formed through testimony are not phenomenal concepts.
The disanalogy between cases like (2) and the psycho-
physical conditional may be brought out by considering anal-
ogous strategies concerning other kinds of concepts. Con-
sider, for example, a natural kind concept strategy applied to 
the following conditional involving a natural kind term (see 
Parvin, 2009).
(3) If x is Au then x is gold.
The sentence (3) is necessary and a posteriori because it 
connects a theoretical concept (Au) to a natural kind concept 
(gold). But now consider:
(4) If x is a number then x is not gold.
(4) connects a theoretical concept to the negation of a 
natural kind concept, but (4) is clearly a priori. Although the 
negation of a natural kind is not a natural kind, the question is 
whether the negation of a natural kind concept requires pos-
session of a natural kind concept. According to Stoljar’s thesis, 
the natural kind concept gold is required to understand the 
consequent of (3) but not the antecedent, just as it is with 
(4). But (4) is a priori like (2), and thus, if we were to follow 
Stoljar’s reasoning, we would conclude that this treatment of 
natural kind terms fails. 
Another disanalogy between cases like (PHYS) and 
other conditionals which connect consequents containing 
experience-dependent concepts and antecedents containing 
only ordinary concepts is (5) (Diaz-Leon, 2008):
(5)  If x is a square circle then x is a red sensation.
Because the antecedent is a priori false, the whole sen-
tence is a priori false. There is no need to understand the con-
sequent in this case. This illustrates another type of sentence 
structurally like (PHYS) but with a different epistemic status. 
The fact that (4) and (5) are a priori does not undermine the 
a posteriority of (PHYS), it shows only that we do not use the 
same criteria to evaluate the epistemic status of (PHYS) that 
we use to evaluate (4) or (5). And this is showed by Diaz-Le-
on (2008):
All that the phenomenal concept strategy 
needs is that phenomenal concepts are not 
a priori connected with the physical-theo-
retical concepts that appear in the anteced-
ent of the psychophysical conditional [...]. 
The strategy does not need to show that no 
phenomenal concept is a priori connected 
to any physical-theoretical concept. If there 
are plausible reasons for thinking that some 
phenomenal concept is a priori connected 
with some physical-theoretical concept, 
why should the advocate of the phenome-
nal concept strategy not accept that? (Di-
az-Leon, 2008, p. 608).
It seems that the strategy achieves the goal of ensuring 
the aposteriority of the conditional by postulating the depen-
dence of phenomenal concepts vis-à-vis experiences. This 
dependence grants the aposteriority of (PHYS) without run-
ning into Kripkean problems for psycho-physical identifica-
tion (or, in our cases, entailment).
Experienced Mary
The second part of Stoljar’s argument concerns the 
treatment of the knowledge argument by the proponents of 
the strategy. Stoljar thinks that the knowledge argument can 
be reformulated such that the new concept explanation is not a 
satisfactory answer to the problem. Versions of the phenom-
enal concept strategy that are committed to the experience 
thesis explain Mary’s epistemic progress in terms of the ac-
quisition of a new concept. Only after leaving the room can 
Mary acquire the new concept that enables her to make the 
appropriate deductions. At this point, the distinction intro-
duced by Stoljar to work against the strategy’s response to the 
conceivability argument could work in favor of the strategy’s 
treatment of the knowledge argument. The experience thesis 
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explains why phenomenal truths are not a priori synthesiz-
able from physical truths, and that would be enough to ex-
plain the epistemic gap between phenomenal concepts and 
physical concepts. However, Stoljar rejects this line of reason-
ing arguing that there is an independent reason to reject the 
phenomenal concept theorist’s explanation of Mary’s igno-
rance. Stoljar offers a different thought experiment in order 
to show that even if Mary possessed the relevant phenomenal 
concepts, she would still not be able to deduce phenomenal 
truths from physical truths. Since the phenomenal concept 
strategy’s treatment of the knowledge argument is to explain 
Mary’s ignorance in terms of her lacking the phenomenal 
concept, the strategy would fail.
Stoljar asks us to consider experienced Mary. She is just 
like Mary for the first part of the story; after experienced 
Mary is released from the black and white room, she has col-
or experiences and, because of that, she is able to apply the 
relevant phenomenal concepts. She is, later, recaptured and 
returned to her room. After she returns to her room, expe-
rienced Mary undergoes a process of selective amnesia: she 
forgets the correct application of phenomenal concepts. She 
still knows what it is like to see green, thus she still possesses 
the phenomenal concepts that she acquired during her short 
period of freedom. However, she fails to make associations 
like “looking at Granny Smith apples typically causes green 
sensations” or “having arthritis causes pain”. Experienced 
Mary cannot deduce phenomenal truths from physical truths 
even though she possesses the corresponding phenomenal concepts. 
In Stoljar’s view, she knows the antecedent of the conditional 
(PHYS) but not its consequent. Stoljar wants to show that 
this new scenario turns the acquisition of phenomenal con-
cepts irrelevant to explain Mary’s ignorance.
I think that the tale of experienced Mary undermines 
the fundamental premise of the knowledge argument against 
physicalism, viz. that Mary has complete physical knowledge 
of visual physiology. If a priori physicalism were correct from 
Mary’s complete physical description of visual physiology, 
Mary would be able to deduce phenomenal truths, for exam-
ple, “what it is like to see red”. But this leads us to the second 
premise of the argument; Mary cannot deduce phenomenal 
truths from physical truths. This epistemic gap puts physical-
ism under pressure. The physicalist needs to explain how to 
accommodate this lack of a priori deducibility in the thesis 
that physical truths metaphysically necessitate phenomenal 
truths. In Stoljar’’s second scenario, Mary leaves the room 
for the first time and gains knowledge to understand all the 
conceptual framework necessary to understand the physical 
knowledge she has while inside the room, but then she is re-
captured and forgets the correct application of the concepts 
she had just learn how to apply. What seems to be missing 
in this version of Mary is information which belongs to the 
antecedent of the conditional P→Q, not to the consequent. 
Deleting part of her memory which would enable Mary to 
correctly apply her color concepts is to delete information 
which belongs to the physical knowledge. Thus, it turns the 
physical knowledge of experienced Mary incomplete; so, 
experienced Mary would not possess the relevant concepts 
to understand the antecedent of the conditional. Without 
means to understand the antecedent, Mary cannot under-
stand the conditional. Stoljar would only be able to conclude 
that the acquisition of phenomenal concepts is irrelevant 
to explain Mary’s ignorance if she were allowed to keep her 
memories as she returned to the black and white room.
The correct application of phenomenal concepts would 
be available to experienced Mary, since it is, in a sense, in-
formation belonging to the objective, physical domain. Mary 
must not undergo any experience to know that a deep cut 
in one’s skin typically causes pain or that looking at Granny 
Smith apples typically causes green sensation, and that looking 
at a red fire hydrant typically causes red sensations. Original 
Mary possesses all this knowledge inside the room, which still 
does not enable her to deduce phenomenal truths from phys-
ical truths. If we add new phenomenal concepts to Mary’s set 
of beliefs, but later discard her beliefs which rule the applica-
tion of those concepts, we discard knowledge that is crucial 
for Mary to understand the antecedent of the conditional but 
not the consequent, this is knowledge that used to be part of 
her complete physical description about the world. Experi-
enced Mary gains phenomenal concepts, but loses ordinary 
concepts. Experience would only enable Mary to ma er the 
concepts she possesses partially while still inside the room. 
However, if experienced Mary already possessed such con-
cepts, the case Stoljar presents to us is not a case in which she 
knows the antecedent of the conditional but cannot deduce 
the consequent. It is a case in which information belonging 
to the antecedent is omitted. Mary cannot deduce phenom-
enal knowledge from incomplete physical knowledge. At this 
point one could ask why would the examples of correct phe-
nomenal belief application be  considered physical knowledge 
given that pain is a phenomenal concept. It is simply by dis-
tinguishing between phenomenal concepts, nonphenomenal 
concepts about phenomenal concepts and psychological con-
cepts that we can understand that this is not at all contro-
versial. The phenomenal concept red sensation is the concept 
of the  ecific type of sensation someone typically has when 
looking at red things. It is very different from the concept Red, 
for this concept refers to red things. It is also different from 
the concept The sensation caused by red things as certain col-
or-blinds will feel green upon looking at red things (Stoljar, 
2005). It is also important to differentiate phenomenal con-
cepts from psychological concepts (Balog, 2009). The latter 
are analyzed in functional terms. A psychological concept is 
an objective, third-person concept, since it refers to a mental 
state, which contains no reference to the subject’s subjective 
experience, whilst a phenomenal concept is formed from 
one’s own per ective. This is just to say that not all concepts 
about phenomenal states are phenomenal concepts. One can 
have nonphenomenal concepts about phenomenal states, just 
as color blinded people believe that Granny Smith apples are 
green without ever having experienced colors.
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Conclusion
In order to respond to the conceivability argument, the 
proponent of the strategy had to argue for the a posteriority 
of (PHYS) by appealing to the experience thesis or any re-
placement thesis drawing on the per ectival nature of phe-
nomenal concepts. The distinction between a priori state-
ments and a priori synthesizable statements is introduced 
by Stoljar in order to show that the best that the experi-
ence thesis accomplishes is to show that physicalism is not 
a priori synthesizable. The latter is admittedly irrelevant to 
the explanation of why (PHYS) is conceivable as false, but 
metaphysically impossible. Nevertheless, Stoljar ignores a 
clear disanalogy present between conditionals like (PHYS) 
and other cases involving ordinary concepts. If Stoljar’s ar-
gument worked against the phenomenal concept strategy, it 
would also generate undesirable results for the way we think 
about natural kind concepts and for paradigmatic cases of 
a priori conditionals. Besides, I also dispute the assumption 
made by Stoljar that negation of a phenomenal concept re-
quire possession of that concept.
Furthermore, I intended to show that the tale of experi-
enced Mary is a non-starter. His strategy consists in deleting 
part of Mary’s memory to show that even if she possesses the 
relevant phenomenal concepts but loses the ability to correct-
ly employ them, she is not able to deduce phenomenal truths 
from physical truths. Deleting part of her memory which 
would enable Mary to correctly apply her color concepts is 
to delete information which belongs to the antecedent of the 
conditional. Without knowledge of the antecedent, she can-
not understand the consequent.
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